Concern about asymmetric information in markets for consumer goods and services has focused on product attribute information. We highlight the importance of another category of information-product use information. In important markets, sellers have better information about how a consumer will use their product or service than the consumer herself. Moreover, we show that the classic unraveling results do not extend to product use information, and thus sellers are less likely to voluntarily disclose this type of information. Our findings have important policy implications: While most disclosure mandates target product attribute information, our analysis suggests that mandating disclosure of product use information may be more important. Indeed, policymakers are beginning to recognize the importance of product use disclosures. * We thank
Introduction
The efficiency of markets depends on the existence of adequate information. In consumer markets, the question is whether consumers have adequate information. We distinguish between two categories of information: product attribute information and product use information. Consider the credit card market. The interest rate on a credit card is an attribute of the credit card product. Borrowing patterns, i.e., how often and how much the consumer borrows on the card, describe how the product is used. The total benefits and costs associated with a product are a function of both product attributes and use patterns. Total interest paid depends both on the interest rate and on the consumer's evolving balance.
Sellers are generally assumed to have better information about the attributes of their products. On the other hand, consumers are generally believed to have better information about how they will use the product, since product use is a function of consumer preferences.
Accordingly, when policymakers impose disclosure mandates on sellers-and this happens very often-they naturally focus on product attribute information. They reason that sellers should be required to disclose their private information, i.e., product attribute information; there is no point in forcing sellers to disclosure product use information, since this is where consumers, not sellers, enjoy the informational advantage.
We take issue with this conventional wisdom on two counts. First, while it is often true that consumers have better product use information than sellers, there are important consumer markets where this is not the case. The credit card market is such a market. The cellular service market provides another example. A pricing manager at a top US cellular service provider commented that "people absolutely think they know how much they will use [their cell phones] and it's pretty surprising how wrong they are." (Grubb [11] ) Presumably, the pricing manager was comparing people's perceived use patterns to a benchmark of actual use patterns, which the provider, and its employees, knew.
Second, we argue that the prevalence of rules requiring product attribute disclosure and the relative paucity of mandatory product use disclosure is, in an important sense, exactly the opposite of what economic theory would recommend. As shown by Grossman & Hart [10] , in many market settings product attribute information will be voluntarily disclosed by firms. Since firms offering higher-quality products would not wish to be pooled with firms offering lower-quality products, an unraveling dynamic leads to voluntary disclosure by all firms (see also Grossman [9] , Milgrom [18] ). An implication of this result is that mandatory disclosure of product attribute information is often unnecessary. (Following Grossman & Hart [10] , Grossman [9] , and Milgrom [17] , we focus on the case where sellers can disclose information verifiably.)
We show that this classic result does not extend to product use information. In essence, the unraveling result assumes that the information is firm-specific, while product-use information is consumer-specific. Put differently, product-use information is common to all firms. It follows that disclosure of product use information, unlike product attribute information, cannot help firms to differentiate themselves from their competitors, and hence the unraveling argument fails. Since we cannot count on voluntary disclosure of product use information, it may be necessary to mandate disclosure.
More specifically, we prove two general results about the likelihood of voluntary disclosure. Extending the standard linear city model from the industrial organization literature, we first replicate the standard full disclosure result for product attribute information. We then shift focus to product use information and show that full disclosure is no longer guaranteed.
Although we work with a model where this conclusion is especially sharp, the more general finding that the market provides stronger pressure to disclose in the product attribute case than in the product use case is robust. The intuition is as follows. In the product attribute case, disclosure by one firm conveys no information to consumers about the other firms' products. Such disclosures therefore have the potential not only to improve expectations of the quality of the firm's product, but also to improve the firm's competitive position vis-à-vis its rivals. In the product use case, on the other hand, only the first effect is present: product use is a characteristic of consumers, and is thus common across firms. The implication of this difference is that a firm's profits will increase more sharply when consumers learn good news about its product attributes than when they learn good news about (their own) product use.
Incentives to disclose product attribute information will thus be stronger than incentives to disclose product use information. In the model examined here, the latter can actually be zero, leading to a no-disclosure equilibrium even when disclosure is costless. More generally, when incentives to disclose are pitted against costs of disclosure, we can expect less disclosure in the product use case than in the product attribute case.
As explained above, voluntary disclosure is more likely with respect to product attribute information, because this information is firm specific; and voluntary disclosure is less likely with respect to product use information, because this information is common across firms.
The driving force of our results is the analytical distinction between private (or firm-specific) values and common values (i.e., value components that are common across firms). Descriptively, it may have been better to frame our analysis and results around the private value vs. common value distinction, rather than the product attribute vs. product use distinction.
In fact, the product attribute vs. product use distinction does not map perfectly onto the private value vs. common value distinction. There are product attributes that are common across firms and there are use patterns that vary from firm to firm and from product to product. Still, we think that there is a high correlation between the attribute-use distinction and the private-common distinction. And, from a policy perspective, the attribute-use taxonomy is likely to gain more traction.
Indeed, after decades of focusing almost entirely on product attribute disclosures, academics and, more importantly, policymakers are starting to recognize the need to mandate disclosure of product-use information. For example, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 imposes a general duty, subject to rules prescribed by the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, to disclose information, including usage data in markets for consumer financial products (Pub. L. 111-203, Title X, Sec. 1033).
Similarly, in August 2009 the Federal Communications Commission released a Notice of Inquiry seeking comment on ways to improve disclosure in telecommunication service markets, including disclosure of information on usage (FCC [7] ). Academics have gone further, proposing mandatory disclosure of product-use information for credit cards, mortgages, payday loans, cell-phones, subscription services and more (Bar-Gill & Ferrari [2] ; Bar-Gill & Stone [3] ; Bar-Gill [1] ; Nalebuff & Ayres [19] ; Lynch & Zauberman [14] ; Sovern [21] ; Thaler & Sunstein [22] ; Kamenica et al. [12] ). This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the distinction between product-attribute information and product-use information. Section 3 contains the formal model and presents our main results about the likelihood of voluntary disclosure of productattribute information and of product-use information. Section 4 discusses two extensions:
(1) the case where disclosure combines both product-attribute information and product-use information (e.g., total cost of ownership (TCO) disclosures, which are sometimes referred to as product life-cycle cost disclosures); and (2) the case where one firm has better product use information than others (e.g., because the firm has already been serving the customer for a period of time). Section 5 describes the limited landscape of existing use pattern disclosure mandates, as well as policy initiatives and academic proposals to expand mandatory product use disclosures. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
Two Categories of Information
Informed choice assumes two distinct categories of information: information about product attributes and information about how the product will be used. One way to view the distinction between product-attribute information and product-use information is by tracing the source of the information. Product attribute information, like the product itself, is created by the manufacturer. The manufacturer is the source of the information. Product use, on the other hand, is a function of three different factors: (1) product attributes, (2) consumer preferences, and (3) external forces that affect the benefit to the consumer from using the product. Correspondingly, product use information has three sources: (1) the manufacturer, (2) the consumer, and (3) nature.
Consumer protection law is concerned with imperfect information on the part of consumers. Traditional consumer protection analysis and policy focus on lack of information about product attributes and, correspondingly, on mandatory disclosure of product-attribute information (Bar-Gill and Ferrari [2] ). This emphasis on product attribute information stems from an assumption that consumers know, or can easily predict their use patterns, and, that, in any event, sellers do not have an informational advantage vis-à-vis consumers with respect to product use information (so that disclosure of use information by sellers is superfluous).
To better understand this assumption, and its limits, recall the three factors that determine a consumer's use patterns: (1) product attributes, (2) consumer preferences, and (3) external forces that affect the benefit to the consumer from using the product. The manufacturer initially has better information about product attributes, but this information asymmetry is eliminated through the disclosure of product attribute information. This leaves consumer preferences and external forces. If both parties are similarly informed (or not informed) about external factors and the consumer has better information about her own preferences, then the consumer is also better informed about use patterns.
We now see the limits of the assumption that consumers are better informed about product use. First, it may well be that sellers have better information than consumers about external factors that affect the benefits to consumers from using the product. If so, sellers may be able to predict a consumer's use patterns better than the consumer herself. Moreover, even with respect to preferences, it is not clear that consumers have better information, especially when the relevant information includes the potentially complex interactions between preferences, product attributes and external forces. In practice, consumers often learn about their use patterns through experience-from past use. The question thus becomes a question of recall. A consumer suffering from imperfect recall may well be at an informational disadvantage as compared to a seller that collects, in large databases, and analyzes prior use information of consumers and, in certain markets, even of this specific consumer.
(We realize that we are pushing the boundaries of the rational choice model here and perhaps even crossing these boundaries.)
The following examples may help make things more concrete. Consider a lawnmower.
The value of a lawnmower to a consumer depends on attributes of the lawnmower and on how frequently the consumer will want or need to mow her lawn. How often the lawnmower will be used depends, in turn, on attributes of the lawnmower, on consumer preferences, and on external factors influencing the consumer's need to mow the lawn. The attributes of the lawnmower matter, because, for example, a better lawnmower is less burdensome to operate and thus will be used more often. Consumer preferences matter, because a consumer who cares more about her lawn will use the lawnmower more often. And external forces, like rainfall and soil condition, matter, because they affect the speed with which grass grows.
To make a fully-informed decision whether to purchase a lawnmower and which lawnmower to purchase the consumer must have information on all of these factors. Yet consumer protection law, with its focus on product attribute information, pays insufficient attention to other factors affecting product use.
Or consider a credit card. Focusing on the financing component of the credit card product, the value of a credit card depends on product attributes, specifically the interest rate. The value of the product depends also on how it will be used-on how much the consumer will borrow. The extent of borrowing, in turn, depends on: (1) product attributes such as the interest rate, (2) the consumer's intertemporal consumption preferences, and (3) external forces affecting the consumer's desire to borrow or need to borrow such as present and expected available income and conditions affecting the demand for funds, e.g., illness or divorce. Policymakers have been concerned about mistakes in the credit card market. Their response, however, has largely been targeted at product attribute information. The Truthin-Lending Act, for example, mandates conspicuous disclosure of credit card interest rates.
Use pattern mistakes that are not caused by imperfect information about interest rates have received less attention.
The importance of product-use information should be evident. It should also be evident that consumers will often have imperfect information about how they will use a product.
But these two observations, in and of themselves, are not enough to justify legal rules that mandate disclosure of product-use information. For mandated disclosure to make sense it is not enough that consumers lack information; sellers must possess the information so that they can disclose it to consumers. As suggested in the Introduction, there are important markets, like the credit card market and the cell-phone market, where sellers do have superior product-use information. But even when sellers have superior product-use information, mandatory disclosure is unwarranted if sellers will disclose the information voluntarily. In the following section, we argue that, at least in certain markets, voluntary disclosure of product-use information is unlikely. Moreover, we show, in Section 3 below, that product use information is less likely than product attribute information to be voluntarily disclosed.
These findings suggest that the current regulatory focus on product attribute disclosures and the relative paucity of product use disclosures should be reconsidered.
Voluntary Disclosure?
We now turn to a formal analysis of sellers' incentives to voluntarily disclose information. We show that while market forces induce voluntary disclosure of product-attribute information, they are less effective in motivating sellers to voluntarily disclose product-use information.
This result provides the impetus for mandating disclosure of product-use information.
As explained in the Introduction, the formal analysis equates product attribute information with private (firm-specific) information and product use information with common information (i.e., information that is common across firms), while acknowledging that this mapping is imperfect. Accordingly, when referring to product use information, we emphasize use patterns that are determined by consumer preferences and external forces (nature)-to use the terminology introduced in Section 2 above. Use patterns that are determined by firm-specific product attributes are considered "product attributes" in the formal analysis.
Framework
We use a standard linear-city model. Two firms, firm 1 and firm 2, are located at opposite ends of a line. The distance between the two firms is 1 unit. There is a unit mass of consumers distributed uniformly along the line. Consumers purchase one unit of a good, at most. (They get no additional utility from purchasing more than one unit of the good.)
This means that each consumer chooses between (i) buying one unit of the good from firm 1, (ii) buying one unit of the good from firm 2, or (iii) not buying at all. The distance x 1 can be interpreted as a measure of how the consumer would rank the two products if they were both of the same quality, in the product attribute case; in the product use case, the two products are assumed to be of the same quality, thus x 1 measures how the consumer would rank the two products. From a slightly different perspective, the fact that x 1 varies across consumers represents heterogeneity on a dimension that is orthogonal to the
The timing of the game is as follows: At stage 1, the two firms simultaneously decide whether to disclose the value that they provide to consumers: v i for firm i (i = 1, 2) in the product attribute case; v in the product use case; and either or both in the general case. Disclosure is costless and verifiable (as in Grossman and Hart [10] and Grossman [9] , for example). At stage 2, the firms simultaneously set prices and consumers make their purchase decisionsà la Bertrand.
The Post-Disclosure Subgame
We analyze the post-disclosure subgames before considering disclosure decisions. As noted above, a consumer located at x 1 chooses between (i) buying one unit of the good from firm 1, (ii) buying one unit of the good from firm 2, or (iii) not buying at all. The consumer will buy from firm 1 if and only if:
, and
Note that E[·] is the consumer's expectation operator, The consumer will buy from firm 2 if and only if:
The consumer will not buy at all if and only if:
Firm 1 faces the following maximization problem:
where
is the demand function that firm 1 faces, capturing both the participation (or individual rationality) and incentive compatibility constraints for the marginal buyer, as given by the inequalities above.
Similarly, firm 2 faces the following maximization problem:
The solution to these maximization problems is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (a) WhenV 1 +V 2 < 2:
(c) WhenV 1 +V 2 > 3 and |V i −V j | ≤ 3:
The proof of this and all other results can be found in the appendix.
Remark 1 (a) When 2 ≤V 1 +V 2 ≤ 3, there are multiple equilibria. We assume a natural equilibrium where demand for each firm's product is proportional to quality-see the appendix for details.
(b) WhenV 1 +V 2 ≥ 2, the market is covered-every consumer on the line buys either from firm 1 or firm 2. WhenV 1 +V 2 < 2, the market is not covered, and each firm has local monopoly power.
denote the equilibrium value of firm i's profit as a function ofV 1 and V 2 . Notice that Π * i is continuous inV 1 andV 2 (across the three ranges:V 1 +V 2 < 2, 2 ≤V 1 +V 2 ≤ 3, andV 1 +V 2 > 3) and strictly increasing inV i withV j held fixed, as long asV i ≥V j − 3.
We now turn to stage 1 of the game-the disclosure stage. We consider first the pure product attribute case, then the pure product use case, and finally (in the next section) the hybrid case.
Product Attribute Information
Recall that the quality of a firm, V i , typically consists of both product attribute components v i that are specific to the firm, and product use components v that are specific to a given consumer but common across firms. Here we consider disclosure of only product attribute components, and let V i = v i . We assume that v 1 and v 2 are drawn independently from the uniform distribution on [0, λ], and further that v i is private information to firm i. This is essentially the framework analyzed by Levin et. al [13] , except that they assume v i > The intuition behind the result is straightforward: Firm 1 will disclose its quality v 1 if and only if, given firm 2's disclosure strategy, its expectation of Π * 1 (v 1 ,v 2 ) is greater than its expectation of Π * 1 (v 1 ,v 2 ). As we show in the appendix, firm 1's expectation of Π * 1 must (given firm 2's disclosure strategy) be strictly increasing in its first argument. Thus firm 1 will disclose if and only if v 1 >v 1 . A simple unraveling argument (see e.g. Milgrom [17] ) then implies that firm 1 will disclose for all values of v 1 .
Product Use Information
We next analyze the incentives to voluntarily disclose product use information. As explained above, we conceptualize product-use information as information that is common to all firms.
Formally, in the pure product use case we assume that V 1 = V 2 = v, and that v is common knowledge among the firms. We further assume that v is drawn from the uniform distribution [0, µ], with µ ≥ 3. As before, we assume that firms choose simultaneously whether or not to disclose before competing in prices. In the pure product use case, however, disclosure by either firm effectively implies disclose by the other, since they share the same v. Only two extreme outcomes are possible.
Proposition 2
In the product use case, there are exactly two kinds of equilibria:
(a) A no-disclosure equilibrium, in which neither firm discloses whatever the value of v.
(b) Full disclosure equilibria, in which one or both firms disclose for all v.
Remark 2 (Intuition) (a) No-disclosure equilibrium: Since value, v, is common to all firms, disclosure provides no competitive advantage to the disclosing firm. Further, in a full information environment, equilibrium prices and profits increase as this common value v increases up to a certain point (v = 1 1 2 ), but are constant thereafter as the market becomes fully covered and competitive pressures prevent either firm from raising price. In the absence of disclosure, expectation of the common value is in the constant-profit range (v ≥ ), then higher value firms will disclose, reaffirming the consumers' beliefs. In essence, absent disclosure, consumers believe that the firms enjoy local monopoly power, and thus firms disclose for the same reason that a monopolist discloses. Remark 3 (Intuition) As explained in the Introduction, the result that voluntary disclosure is less likely in the product use case is robust. A firm's profits will increase less sharply when consumers learn good news about (their own) product use than when they learn good news about the firm's product attributes. Thus in a more general model, where incentives to disclose are pitted against (positive) disclosure costs, there will be less disclosure in the product use case than in the product attribute case.
Comparing Proposition 2 to Proposition 1 reveals a sharp difference between the product attribute (private values) case, where full disclosure is the only equilibrium, and the product use (common values) case, where there is also a no-disclosure equilibrium. This difference justifies greater regulatory attention to the product use case. We next elaborate on the welfare and policy implications of Proposition 2.
Welfare and Policy Implications
Proposition 2 shows that firms might not disclose product use information voluntarily. No disclosure creates welfare costs that could potentially justify regulation. These costs are identified and quantified below. We start by identifying the first-best level of welfare. We then compare this benchmark to the welfare levels obtained under the no disclosure and full disclosure equilibria.
First-Best: First-best welfare is obtained when consumers purchase the good from the closest firm if and only if the value they obtain (v) exceeds the cost of traveling to the firm (x). It is:
No Disclosure: In the absence of disclosure, each firm makes a profit of 1 2 , and thus total firm profits are equal to 1. The consumer surplus is give by:
And total welfare is:
The welfare loss, due to inefficient purchase of low-value products, equals:
Full Disclosure: With full disclosure, each firm makes an expected profit of
Total firm profits thus equal 24µ − 23 24µ . Consumer surplus is given by:
Thus the expected consumer surplus is:
Total welfare is:
The welfare loss-deadweight loss from monopoly pricing-equals:
.
We can now state the following result: , because the market is covered under no disclosure, while consumers located near the center of the line should not be purchasing the good. On the other hand, under full disclosure some consumers are priced out of the market by sellers charging monopoly mark-ups; with no disclosure, the market is always covered, so there is no welfare loss resulting from this monopoly distortion. For the functional forms we have chosen, these two effects exactly cancel out.
, since the loss from the consumers who buy but shouldn't under no disclosure exceeds the loss from the consumers who don't buy but should under full disclosure.
(ii) In the [
, since the loss from the consumers who don't buy but should under full disclosure exceeds the loss from consumers who do buy but shouldn't under no disclosure.
(iii) In the [
, since the market is covered under no disclosure (and should be from a welfare standpoint), while monopoly pricing scares off some consumers under full disclosure.
, since the market is covered in both cases.
Remark 5 (Regulation)
(a) A no disclosure equilibrium generates a welfare cost. Therefore, there is room to consider regulatory intervention to reduce this welfare cost. Specifically, since voluntary disclosure may fail, regulators should consider mandatory disclosure of product use information.
(b) Mandatory disclosure would, if it works well and costs little, lead to the full disclosure equilibrium. But the preceding analysis shows that full disclosure imposes welfare costs of its own-costs that may be similar in magnitude to those imposed by no disclosure.
We nevertheless believe that our analysis provides the impetus for serious consideration of disclosure mandates (for product use information). First, the welfare costs of full disclosure are standard monopoly costs and can be addressed through other means that are designed to police monopolistic behavior (e.g., antitrust law). Second, as explained above, the result that welfare costs under no disclosure equal welfare costs under full disclosure is an artifact of our simplifying assumption that possible v-values are uniformly distributed. Under alternative assumptions the welfare costs under no disclosure may well exceed the welfare costs under full disclosure. For example, consider a distribution with a mass at a very low v level and a thick tail at high v levels (suppose that this tail is sufficiently thick to ensure that, in the absence of any disclosure,v = µ/2 and thus that a no disclosure equilibrium exists). Remark 4 suggests that, with such a distribution, welfare costs under no disclosure exceed the welfare costs under full disclosure.
(c) Mandatory disclosure that replaces a no disclosure outcome with a full disclosure outcome may also be justified on distributional grounds, since the consumer surplus is larger (and firm profits smaller) under full disclosure.
Extensions

Combining Product-Attribute and Product-Use Disclosures
In some real-world cases, firms can issue a single disclosure that combines both product attribute information and product use information. For example, a firm that sells ink-jet printers can disclose the life-cycle cost of the printer (sometimes referred to as a total cost of ownership (TCO) disclosure), which combines product use information-estimates of ink usage-with product attribute information about the printer's price, the price of ink and the number of pages that the printer prints per ink cartridge.
Thus far, we have studied the product attribute case separately and the product use case separately. We now extend our model and allow the basic utility that the consumer gets from purchasing a good to consist of both product attribute and product use components, and allow for disclosures of one component or both. Formally, we assume that the basic utility the consumer obtains from good i is given by the sum of the two components:
Thus if a consumer located at a distance of x i from firm 1 buys from firm 1, her utility is v +v 1 −x 1 −p 1 , and if she buys from firm 2, her utility is v +v 2 −(1−x 1 )−p 2 . We assume that Our analysis of the "combined case" affirms the previous results, specifically that there is an equilibrium in which product use information will not be disclosed-neither separately nor in combination with product attribute information.
Proposition 4 For all v, v i , and i = 1, 2:
(a) In every equilibrium, firm i discloses the value of either v i or v + v i .
(b) There exists an equilibrium in which each firm discloses only the value of v i .
Remark 6 (Robustness) Proposition 4 assumes that v and v i are additively separable.
These results, however, can be generalized to the case where V is any strictly increasing function of v and v i , as long as v and v i are independently distributed.
Asymmetrically Informed Firms
We have thus far assumed that the two firms are symmetrically informed. Focusing on the product use (common value) case, we assumed that both firms know v. This assumption is realistic when the information pertains to average use, e.g., how many pages the average consumer (or average consumer of a certain demographic) prints in a year. In other cases, where the information pertains to individual use patterns, the symmetry assumption is unrealistic. For instance, if a cellular service subscriber has been on the Verizon network for the past 3 years, Verizon will have better information on this subscriber's use patterns than AT&T.
We extend our analysis of the product use (common value) case to allow for asymmetrically- 
Proper-Use Information
Use information is provided through disclosures that specify the proper use of a product. The
Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC) has general authority to promulgate "requirements that a consumer product be marked with or accompanied by clear and adequate warnings or instructions" (15 U.S.C. § 2056). The purpose of this provision is to provide information on how to use the product properly. Under this authority the CPSC has issued regulations requiring the disclosure of proper-use information for numerous products. proper use. There is one proper way to wash a pair of jeans. There is no single, well-defined way to use a credit card. 4 When proper use is not well defined, and even when it is welldefined, sellers can disclose another type of product-use information-actual-use information.
We next consider statistical actual use information, i.e., average-use information.
Average-Use Information
Pure average use disclosure mandates are hard to find in current law. There are, however, several examples of disclosure mandates that combine average use or typical use information with product attribute information. For example, the EPA's miles-per-gallon ratings, calculated for two different use assumptions-"city driving" and "highway driving"-combine product use information (where you drive) with product attribute information (technical information on the car's engine, weight, etc.) (42 U.S.C. § 6201).
The energy-efficiency feature of home appliances is similarly disclosed using a typical use benchmark. A major cost of home appliances is energy cost. The energy cost depends on product attributes, i.e., on technical features of the appliance, and on the consumer's use patterns. The FTC constructed an energy efficiency index for appliances, based on typical use, and required manufacturers to disclose their product's Energy Efficiency Rating' (16 C.F.R. § 305).
Nutrition information listed on food labels provides another example. Information on the quantity of nutrients per-serving combines product attribute information with assumptions about typical use (the assumption is that the average consumer consumes one serving or, alternatively, that the per-serving information will be used by the consumer to calculate total value). Food labels also provide "percent daily value" information for the included nutrients.
Food product manufacturers must include the statement "Percent Daily Values are based on a 2,000 calorie diet." And, in some cases, a more detailed disclosure of daily values based on both a 2,000 calorie and a 2,500 calorie diet is required (21 C.F.R. § 101.9(d) (9)). The percent daily value information adds further assumptions about typical use-moving from assumptions about the typical use of the specific food product to assumptions about the consumer's overall diet.
Disclosures pertaining to the risks associated with cigarette smoking also make certain assumptions about use patterns. In addition to mandated warnings, tobacco companies voluntarily provide information about the risks of smoking. Specifically they provide information about the levels of tar and nicotine produced by the cigarette. This information, while voluntarily disclosed, is certified by the FTC. Tar and nicotine levels depend on product attributes as well as on use patterns. The FTC developed a machine-based test to objectively measure tar and nicotine levels, and the tar and nicotine measures provided by the FTC test assume a certain intensity of smoking-a 2-second, 35-milliliter puff every minute (FTC 1997).
Academics have proposed additional disclosures. Relying on evidence that consumers are too quick to purchase extended warranties, Professors Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff proposed to mandate disclosure of the probability that an extended warranty would be invoked (Nalebuff and Ayres [19] , p. 181). Or, even better, sellers could be required to provide an estimate of the total repair or replacement costs that a typical consumer would save by purchasing the extended warranty. With this use-pattern information, extended warranties and similar insurance add-ons would likely suffer a sharp decline in sales.
5
In the rebates context, Jeff Sovern has recently proposed that sellers offering rebates be required to disclose the low redemption rates. 6 Similarly, to guard against the risk that Hewlett-Packard (HP) customers, when purchasing a home printer, underestimate the number of ink cartridges that they will purchase over the life of the printer, HP could be required to provide the missing use-pattern information, perhaps based on an FTCdesigned average-use index. Even better, HP could be required to disclose average Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) information that combines the use-pattern information with ink prices. And health clubs could be required to disclose the effective per-visit fee paid by an average subscription holder. If this effective per-visit fee is eight times higher than the club's actual per-visit fee, some consumers may reconsider their decision to purchase a subscription (DellaVigna and Malmendier [5] ).
Average use disclosures could also be effective in the credit card market. Some consumers are sometimes late in paying their credit card bill. And when they are late, they are assessed a "late fee." This late fee is prominently disclosed in credit card solicitations, in accordance with the disclosure regulations issued under the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA). 7 But this product attribute disclosure will not be very effective if consumers underestimate the likelihood of paying late. Issuers could be required to disclose the number of late payments that an average consumer makes in a year or the amount that an average consumer pays in late fees in one year.
In a related context, payday lenders make most of their profits from rolling-over (or renewing) loans for their customers and the concern is that the customers underestimate the likelihood, and cost, of these roll-overs. Payday lenders could be required to disclose the average number of roll-overs and, based on the average number of roll-overs, the total fee paid by an average consumer. For example, the disclosure could read: "The fee is $30 for a two-week, $200 advance. The average borrower renews her loan three times (namely, takes 5 Interestingly, use-pattern information for the insurance add-on is a function of both product attribute information and product-use information for the base good. For example, the likelihood that an extended warranty will be invoked depends on the reliability of the base good and on how the base good is used.
6 See Sovern [21] The value of average-use information depends (inversely) on the degree of heterogeneity. The degree of heterogeneity is a function of both product characteristics and characteristics of the consumer group. But the degree of heterogeneity is also a function of the disclosure regime.
The question is whether the seller discloses average-use information, where the averaging is done across the entire group of consumers, or whether the averaging on which the disclosure is based is done across a smaller, more homogenous subgroup of consumers. 
Individual-Use Information
The consumer heterogeneity problem limits the efficacy of average-use disclosure. It also supports individual-use disclosure. In certain markets, where sellers enter long-term rela- 
Credit Cards
As noted in the Introduction, credit card issuers have a lot(!) of individual use information about their customers and they can be required to disclose this information to their customers.
In fact, they are already required to disclose one piece of information repayment information. Congress was concerned that consumers lack information on the cost of slow repayment of their credit card debt. Specifically, many consumers who make only the minimum monthly payment underestimate the amount of time that it will take them to repay their credit card debt and, consequently, underestimate the total amount of interest that they will end-up paying. In response, Congress required issuers to disclose, on the monthly statement, the length of time it will take them to repay their current balance in full if they makes only the minimum required payment each month (12 C.F.R. 226.7).
But more can be done. Recall the late payment, and late fee, example. We argued that the disclosure of the late fee-a product attribute disclosure-might be less effective, if many consumers underestimate the likelihood of paying late. In discussing average-use disclosures, we suggested mandating disclosure of the number of late payments that an average consumer makes over a one-year period. But the value of such a disclosure will be limited if most consumers optimistically believe that they will pay late less often than the average consumer. A better solution is to require disclosure of individualized late payment information. 8 Issuers keep records on consumers' late payments. They can be required to disclose the number of late payments made by the specific consumer, or the total amount of late fees paid by the consumer, over the past year.
9
From late fees to overlimit fees: Disclosure of individualized use-pattern information can also be effective when provided at the point of sale. Ronald Mann proposed that issuers be required to disclose, through merchants, when a certain purchase would take the consumer over her credit limit, triggering an overlimit fee. Such a disclosure could help the consumer avoid inadvertently exceeding her credit limit, perhaps by switching to another card or to another payment system (Mann [16] , p. 162).
Cell Phones
The cellular service market is another market where the long-term relationship between providers and consumers allows for the provision of individualized use-pattern information.
Evidence suggests that consumers have poor information about how they use their cell phones, leading to mistakes in plan choice (Grubb [11] ; Bar-Gill and Stone [3] ). Individualized disclosure can reduce consumer mistakes about cell phone use. This disclosure could be supplemented by information on alternative service plans that would reduce the total price paid by the consumer, given her current use patterns. See also Sunstein and Thaler [22] , pp. 93-94. Moreover, individual-use information can be helpfully provided in real-time.
To reduce the incidence of inadvertently exceeding the plan limit and thus incurring high overage fees, sellers could be required to notify consumers, via a recorded message or a text message, when they are about to exceed the plan limit. (Some sellers already provide this information voluntarily.) A consumer receiving such notification may well decide to cut the conversation short, switch to a land line, or postpone the conversation until off-peak hours.
Other Markets
Sellers have individual-use information in many other markets. Some of this information is currently being disclosed to consumers. But enhanced disclosure requirements may be desirable. For example, phone (not cell phone) companies disclose certain use information to consumers on the monthly bill. More effective disclosure would include use-patterns averaged across several months, perhaps accompanied by total cost information under the consumer's could also be required to disclose individualized use-pattern information. Specifically, health clubs could disclose attendance records for the past year and even for the preceding year (or years). They could also calculate and disclose the per-visit fee paid by the individual subscription-holder. Faced with such information when asked to renew the subscription, the consumer may well decide to forgo the subscription and pay on a per-visit basis. Similarly, a retailer asking a consumer to renew a membership card or a discount card, could be required to disclose the total savings enjoyed by the individual consumer over the past year. This information would assist the consumer in making a more informed decision whether to pay the annual fee and renew her membership.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we identify an important yet understudied category of information-product use information. We show that in comparison to (the more commonly studied) product attribute information, product use information is less likely to be voluntarily disclosed by sellers. These findings suggest that policymakers should consider mandating disclosure of product use information, or disclosures that combine product attribute information with product use information. This proposal runs contrary to much of the current regulatory landscape, which focuses on product attribute disclosures.
We are cognizant of justified concerns about information overload. We wish to emphasize that our proposal is not intended to exacerbate the information overload problem by simply adding more disclosure mandates. We advocate for better disclosure, not more disclosure.
Product use information can be incorporated into existing disclosure regimes without increasing the burden placed on consumers. And to the extent that disclosure of larger amounts of use information is considered, this disclosure should be provided in electronic form to facilitate the work of sophisticated intermediaries who will process the information on behalf of consumers. 11 For example, in the telecommunications market, the Federal Communications Commission has already recognized the potential importance of both electronic disclosure and intermediaries (FCC 2009).
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
To solve the firms' maximization problems, we consider three (exhaustive) possibilities:
Case 1.
In case 1, firm 1 solves max
Analogous calculations thus apply to firm 2, giving a profit-maximizing price of p 2 =V 2 /2. Substituting these prices back into condition (1), we obtainV 1 +V 2 < 2. Quantity sold by firm i is given by
Firm profits are:
Case 2.
11 Such intermediaries already exist in important consumer markets. See e.g., Billshrink.com.
In case 2, firm 1 solves
The FOC is: The quantity sold by firm i is given by
Note however that these expressions are only valid when |V 1 −V 2 | ≤ 3; if this condition is not satisfied, one of the non-negativity constraints is violated: x 1 < 0 or x 2 < 0. In this case, the higher-quality firm (firm i ifV i >V j ) will raise its price to the point where its lower-quality competitor is just unable to enter the market even if it charges a price of zero. IfV i >V j , then, equilibrium prices are given by:
Quantity sold is given by x i = 1 and x j = 0, and profit by Π i =V i −V j − 1 and Π j = 0.
Case 3.
In case 3, both the participation constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint are binding. We can derive lower and upper bounds on the price charged by firm 1. First suppose that p 1 <V 1 /2. Then if firm 1 increases its price, demand is given byV 1 − p 1 since noŵ Rearranging and using condition (3) to eliminate p 2 , we obtain:
Note that (4) is tight whenV 1 +V 2 = 2, and (5) (4) and (5) is where demand for the two firms is proportional to quality:
Henceforth we assume that in any subgame in which 2 ≤V 1 +V 2 ≤ 3, this equilibrium is played.
Proof of Proposition 1. First note that, for all v 1 ∈ (λ − 3, λ], Π * 1 (v 1 , v 2 ) is strictly increasing in v 1 for all v 2 . It follows from e.g. Milgrom [17] that firm 1 will disclose for all (since µ > 3). Firms cannot earn more than this by disclosing, however high the value of v. This proves the existence of a no disclosure equilibrium.
It is easy to see that disclosing the value of v does not change i's profit.
(ii) |v i − v j | > 3. Then V i −V j > 3. Assume w.l.o.g. that v i > v j . Then:
Π i =V i −V j − 1 = v i − v j − 1, and Π j = 0.
Again, it is easy to see that disclosing the value of v does not change either firm's profit.
